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his project focuses on the extent to which dis-
ability insurers should be allowed to use genetic
information in underwriting a d rate-setting,
but this subject cannot be completely isolated from
the related questions of whether life and health insur-
ers should also have this discretion. Federal and state
laws place significant restrictions on insurers' use of
genetic information in health insurance, but regula-
tion of such use in life and disability insurance is con-
siderably more modest. This essay examines the rea-
sons for this disparity and discusses the implications
for future proposals to regulate disability insurers' use
of genetic information in underwriting and rate-set-
ting. The thesis is relatively simple: Communitarian
values are stronger in health insurance than in life and
disability insurance. Accordingly, the public is likely to
acquiesce to insurers' insistence that they be allowed to
make distinctions among insureds in disability insur-
ance (and life insurance) that would not be tolerated
in health insurance. The pattern of existing regulation
with respect to genetic information bears this out, and
the odds that this pattern will change in the future are
low.
I. The Risks Covered
Although many points of reference exist for compar-
ing life, disability, and health insurance, the differ-
ences among the products with regard to risks covered
is an obvious starting place. Life, health, and disabil-
ity insurance are all examples of personal insurance
and are to be distinguished from property insurance
and liability insurance, the other major insurance cat-
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egories. But life, disability, and health insurance each
protect against different kinds of losses. Life insur-
ance is designed to protect the insured's beneficiaries
against the economic loss associated with the insured's
premature death. At its core, life insurance covers the
economic value of a human life, which is a function
of the insured's earning capacity and the financial
dependence of other persons on that capacity. Usually,
we imagine the dependent interests to be immediate
family or household members, such as the surviving
spouse or partner or the insured's children. But busi-
ness interests also have economic stakes in the con-
tinued existence of some lives, and protecting these
interests is an extremely important purpose of many
life insurance contracts.
One aspect of life insurance that distinguishes it
from other products is that it can be structured as an
investment vehicle. For example, life insurance can be
used to create and fund a charitable gift., This kind of
use is very different from protecting against the risk
that a dependent will suffer economic losses, and it
is not something one can do with disability or health
insurance. Similarly, one can use life insurance to make
an end-of-life gift to a dependent that exceeds the
dependent's reliance on the insured's earning capac-
ity. In other words, it is possible to insure one's life for
more than its economic value measured in terms of
the insured's earning capacity, thereby facilitating the
creation of an estate that is given to a child, partner,
or spouse (or some other person) upon the insured's
death. A person has an unlimited insurable interest in
her own life, which means that she can lawfully insure
her own life for an unlimited amount. As a general
matter, insurers are unwilling to sell coverage grossly
disproportionate to the insured's earning potential,
as this creates an unacceptable amount of moral haz-
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ard (i.e., an unacceptable risk that the insured will
self-destruct in order to make the large gift to a ben-
eficiary) or signals the operation of adverse selection
(i.e., the insured applies for large amounts of coverage
because she knows premature death is probable and
either hopes that the insurer will not discover a mis-
representation or undisclosed fact in the application
process or that the insured will survive the policy's con-
testability period). But insurers tolerate mismatches
between underwritten amounts and earning power,
which allows for life insurance to be used for purposes
other than indemnifying loss. In contrast, disability
and health insurance indemnify loss and have no col-
lateral investment function.
The purpose of health insurance is to cover the costs
of hospitalization or medical care resulting from ill-
ness or accident. Unlike the economic value of a life
or a person's earning capacity, hospital and medical
expenses are finite and easily measurable. Health
insurance, at least as it originated as a commercial
insurance product (most modern health insurance
functions very differently, as explained below), indem-
nifies the insured against these losses by reimbursing
the insured's out-of-pocket expenses. In contrast, life
insurance makes no effort to match proceeds paid with
actual losses.
There is, however, a more fundamental difference
between health insurance, on the one hand, and life
and disability insurance, on the other. The root of this
distinction springs from how health insurance origi-
nated in the United States. Until 1930, most health
care was handled on a fee-for-service basis. One
consequence of the Great Depression was that many
middle-income citizens found themselves unable to
pay for health care out of personal funds. When the
public stopped using hospital and physician services
(or stopped paying for the services they did use), many
hospitals and physicians were threatened with insol-
vency. In direct response to these economic conditions,
health care providers organized the first important
health insurance plans. These were prepayment plans
(the hospital plan, which was created first, became
known as "Blue Cross" and the physician plan became
known as "Blue Shield") where for a small premium
the consumer became entitled to the receipt of ser-
vices (up to a stated limit) in the event of sickness or
injury. Whether the principal purpose of these con-
tracts was to transfer and distribute risk (the function
of an insurance contract) or to pre-purchase services
on a contingency (the function of a fixed-price require-
ments contract) was not obvious, and the argument
that these arrangements did not constitute insurance
prevailed in some early cases. 2 With the rapid growth
of managed care since the 1970s, most modern health
insurance arrangements now resemble these early pre-
payment plans more than the traditional indemnity
arrangements that would emerge later. As a result,
what is commonly called "health insurance" - and is
more accurately labeled a "health care plan" - involves
paying a fixed prices in advance for all the services one
requires during a defined time frame. This is not the
"business of insurance" under the standard defini-
tions, even if some elements of risk transference and
distribution are embedded in the contract.4 Life and
disability insurance have no element of prepayment
for the delivery of services; thus, these products are
fundamentally different from what is commonly called
"health insurance'
Another fundamental feature of insurance is that
it pays for unforeseen, accidental, and usually large
fortuitous losses that individuals cannot absorb with
their own resources. Health plans are now expected
to pay for routine, small expenses that are foreseeable
and for which the non-poor can easily pay out of exist-
ing assets. These include, for example, physical exam-
inations (which are not fortuitous losses), physician
visits for minor ailments, routine prescriptions, and so
on. This underscores the observation that 21st century
health insurance is largely prepayment of expected
medical services, as opposed to the insuring of unex-
pected, fortuitous losses. In contrast, both life insur-
ance and disability insurance are designed to compen-
sate for large, unexpected (at least in the sense that the
timing of death, which itself will occur, is uncertain)
fortuitous losses.
Disability insurance is similar to health insurance in
that the same perils - illness or accident - are covered,
but the two products cover different manifestations of
those perils. Whereas health insurance compensates
for the out-of-pocket expenses associated with hospital
or medical services, disability insurance compensates
for the insured's loss of income due to illness or acci-
dent. Life insurance is related to disability insurance
in the sense that death is the most severe of all dis-
abilities, but in life insurance, unlike disability insur-
ance, the principle of indemnity is weak. In disability
insurance, insurers contract to pay less than a person's
lost income, which helps ensure that the principle of
indemnity is not violated (i.e., the proceeds paid by
the insurer may not exceed the insured's loss). Many
other provisions in disability insurance contracts can
be explained as insurers' efforts to ensure that they do
not pay proceeds for undeserving claims.
II. Private Industry versus Government
as Provider of Last Resort
There are, of course, private markets in which life, dis-
ability, and health insurance products are sold. In one
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part of the market, the coverage is sold by insurers to
consumers on an individual basis; in the other, it is
sold to group representatives, usually employers, for
the benefit of members of the group, usually employ-
ees. The extent of private ownership is one measure
of insurers' success in marketing its product and the
strength of consumer demand for it. It sheds light on
how valuable the product is to the public, but it can
also illuminate barriers that insurers face in bringing
the product to the market.
With respect to each of these products, a public ver-
sion of the coverage also exists in which the govern-
ment plays a role as either the "facilitator" of the prod-
uct (meaning that the government compels employers
to provide coverage or pay the employee's cost of par-
ticipating in a program) or as the provider of the prod-
uct, essentially underwriting the coverage and serving
as the insurer of last resort. The extent of the public
version of the coverage is important for two reasons.
It provides some measure of the extent to which the
public is unwilling to tolerate gaps in access or avail-
ability left by the operation of supply and demand in
private markets. Also, to the extent the government
deploys its resources to fill these gaps, a statement is
made about how the public perceives the social welfare
importance of the insurance coverage and the extent
to which the public will insist upon government inter-
vention to ensure that appropriate minimum cover-
age is provided. As the following discussion shows, the
strength of the public commitment to minimum cov-
erage varies in health, life, and disability insurance.
A. Health Insurance
In the United States, it is assumed that everyone
obtains health insurance coverage - which is for most
people the ticket to health care services of any kind
or quality - through one of four options: employer-
provided insurance (group insurance or employer-
provided self-insurance); Medicare for the aged and
some persons under age 65 (including some disabled
persons); Medicaid for the indigent; and individual
insurance for everyone else. This approach to health
care access is, however, imperfect. In 2004, 68 percent
of the U.S. population had private insurance (88 per-
cent of which was provided on a group basis). 5 Almost
100 percent of the 39.7 million persons over age 65
or disabled (or both) received coverage through the
Medicare program. 6 In 2004, approximately 37.5 mil-
lion indigent persons, including many aged, blind, and
disabled persons as well as poor mothers and children,
received some coverage through the Medicaid pro-
gram.7 When private and government insurance pro-
grams are combined, approximately 84.3 percent of
the U.S. population in 2004 had some form of private
or government health insurance. This leaves, however,
approximately 45.8 million persons - or 15.7 percent of
the entire population - without any health insurance
coverage. 8 As large as these numbers are, they disguise
the fact that nearly one-third of the U.S. population
under age 65 lacks health insurance at some point dur-
ing any given year.9
Even with these major gaps, the government pres-
ence in the health care system as a provider of insur-
ance or direct payer of health care services is massive.
In 2003, federal and state government health expen-
ditures for health care exceeded $766 billion, which is
45.7 percent of total public and private expenditures.10
This figure represented seven percent of gross domes-
tic product in 2000." Medicare alone financed 17.5
percent of all health care spending in 2003,12 whereby
most of the funding for this program comes from fed-
eral tax revenues. 13 The Medicaid program, which
along with some other public assistance programs
financed 16.7 percent of all health care spending in
2003,14 is funded almost exclusively through federal
and state tax revenues.
Where the federal or state government does not
invest resources directly, Congress and state legisla-
tures channel the spending of private resources toward
these public objectives. Federal laws such as COBRA,"5
HIPAA,16 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,1 7 the
Newborns and Mothers Health Protection Act,' the
Mental Health Parity Act,'9 and the Women's Health
and Cancer Rights Act,20 not to mention hundreds of
mandated benefits law at the state level, have a net col-
lective impact of expanding the coverage that would
otherwise be provided in an unregulated private mar-
ket. When these regulations are combined with the
various programs that provide access to categories of
persons (including the elderly, the poor, and children),
it is fair to assert that the U.S. health care system is
now in the midst of a slow, incremental march toward
universal access.2'
In life insurance and disability insurance, there is
nothing remotely comparable to the regulatory man-
agement and the public financial investment that
exists in health insurance. Indeed, dating back to the
Truman administration, presidents have periodically
put the health care access issue on center stage in the
national political discussion. There has never been a
similar national discussion or similar expressions of
national concern over access to either life or disability
insurance. In essence, health insurance is more impor-
tant. This is not surprising, given that the public's
health - and thus the insurance that provides access
to the health care that sustains it - is fundamental in
that each individual's ability to function as a mem-
ber of society, including the ability to earn income and
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Table I
Survivors' Annual Benefit Payments in 2006 for Survivor of Worker
with Death at Age 40, in current dollars, using SSA default
assumptions as to deceased's prior earnings history*
Salary on death date 40000 60000 800 100000 200,000
Child 7,464 I j376 15300 17,160 18,960 19,824
Spouse caring for child 7,464 11,376 15,300 17,160 18,960 19,824
Spouse only 9,948 15,168 20,400 22,854 25,284 26424
Family maximum 14,953 28,398 35,71 1 40,062 44,264 46,272
*Note:These amounts assume the dependent's eligibility. For example, the spouse is not eligible
to receive these benefits until he or she reaches age 60 unless the spouse is disabled or is car-
ing for a dependent child; also, the amounts in the table will be reduced if the spouse elects to
begin the payments before reaching his or her full retirement age.These figures are derived from
calculators available on the Social Security Administration Web site, http://www.ssa.gov.
meet other needs, depends on it. The loss of life or the
advent of disability can have extremely harsh conse-
quences, but health and access to health care services
rest on an even higher plane.
B. Life Insurance
Private ownership of life insurance in the United States
is substantial. Over two-thirds of all families in the
U. S. own some kind of life insurance. 2 2 In 2005, indi-
vidual life insurance accounted for 54 percent of all life
insurance in force in the United States, and the aver-
age new policy had a face value of $158,000.23 Group
insurance accounted for the remaining 45 percent
(with credit life insurance constituting the final one
percent).24 In 2000, the average amount of life insur-
ance coverage per insured household was $196,200, a
figure equal to approximately 35 months of disposable
personal income for the average household.25 In 2005,
waiver of premium provisions, a limited form of dis-
ability insurance that removes the insured's obligation
to pay premiums in the event of disability, existed in 25
percent of individual life insurance and 23.8 percent
of group policies in force.26 At the end of 2005, total
life insurance in force in the United States reached
$18.4 trillion.27
There is a program ofpublic life insurance embedded
in the Social Security system. Because Social Security
is synonymous with retirement benefits in the national
vocabulary, the life insurance component of the Social
Security program is commonly overlooked. The survi-
vors' benefits program under the Social Security sys-
tem provides an annuity for survivors of a person who
participated in the Social Security system. The private
analogue for this coverage is a life insurance policy
that pays the face value of the proceeds at death but
gives the beneficiary the option of accepting a settle-
ment in the form of some kind of annuity.28
For a person to be eligible for a survivor's benefit in
the Social Security system, the person must be either a
surviving spouse of the deceased worker, an unmarried
child of the deceased worker under age 18 (or up to age
19 if he or she is attending high school full-time), a
child of any age of the worker who was disabled before
age 22 and remains disabled, or a dependent parent of
the deceased worker age 62 or older.29 Moreover, the
deceased worker must have been qualified for Social
Security benefits. Ten years (or "40 quarters") of work
qualifies a person's dependents for survivor's benefits,
but in some cases fewer years (or "quarters") can make
dependents eligible. For example, the requirement is
reduced for workers who die at a young age; if the sur-
viving spouse is the caregiver for dependent children,
that person can obtain benefits if the worker has six
credits (or 1.5 years) of work. The benefits paid to sur-
vivors depend on the survivors' status, the age of the
worker upon death, and the worker's earnings history.
Table 1 lists the annual payments made to the surviv-
ing dependents of a worker who died at age 40 while
earning various annual salaries at death ranging from
$20,000 to $200,000.30
As Table I shows, for a surviving spouse or any other
dependent, the annual payment is modest. These pay-
ments are in the vicinity of current poverty line defini-
tions.31 Although the dollar amounts rise as the worker's
salary at death increases, payments as a percentage of
the deceased worker's final salary decline steeply. The
family maximum caps total payments to one family,
causing the per-child payment when a surviving par-
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ent has a second child to decline by about half, with no
payment increase being made for the third child and
every child thereafter. Payments also decline in every
dependent category as the age of the deceased worker
increases. Table 2 illustrates this using a dependent
child as an example.
Although the survivors' benefits payable under
Social Security are not inconsequential, the amounts
fall well short of the sums needed to provide a sub-
sistence existence. Yet when discounted, the present
values of the annuities are not insubstantial; indeed,
they exceed the face value of the average individual
life insurance policy purchased in the United States.
For example, if a worker dies at age 60, has a sur-
viving spouse also age 60, had $40,000 in earnings
in the year of death, and had a prior earnings his-
tory equal to the default assumptions used by the
SSA, the surviving spouse's monthly benefit under
the current program would be $1,121. If, however,
the survivor elects to take the benefit before reach-
ing full retirement age, the benefit would need to be
reduced accordingly. In this instance, if the survivor
elects to take the benefit at age 60, the reduction is
28.5 percent, producing a monthly benefit of $802.
Persons who reach age 60 are currently predicted to
have average remaining life spans of 22.0 years. The
present value of the annuity for a person having a
remaining life span of 22.0 years, assuming a dis-
count rate of five percent, is $128,802.32 This figure
is a rough approximation of the annuity purchased in
the private market that would be needed to produce
the same earnings stream33 and should bear some
relationship to the face value of a life insurance policy
that would be fully paid up at age 60 with an annuity
settlement option. 4
This figure, however, does not represent the "public"
contribution to the survivor's payments, given that the
worker contributed a percentage of his or her earn-
ings to the Social Security trust fund annually and the
employer matched this contribution. When the future
value of these contributions is calculated for a worker
who dies at age 60 with the same default earnings
assumptions and assuming a rate of return on contri-
butions of five percent, the future value is $158,454, 3 5
a sum well in excess of the present value of the annuity
to be paid beginning at age 60. Moreover, the excess
rises as earnings of the deceased worker increase. For
example, if the earnings at death of this 60-year-old
worker were $100,000, the monthly payment for
the surviving spouse, using the same assumptions
(including the discount rate of five percent), would be
$1,288 per month, which equates to a present value
of $204,758. But the future value of the deceased
worker's contributions, using the same assumptions,
is $378,612, implying that the cross-subsidy provided
by this employee to the benefits of other workers and
their spouses exceeds $170,000.
Of course, the foregoing examples oversimplify the
premises on which the Social Security survivors' pro-
gram is based.3 6 But the examples do illustrate a basic
point. The life insurance coverage program in the
Social Security program receives no public subsidy, but
is instead fully funded, at least presently, by employee
and matching employer contributions. Thus, instead
of reflecting a consensus that the coverage is so impor-
tant that public resources should be invested in it, the
life insurance component of Social Security simply
reflects a consensus that a mandatory life insurance
(and retirement benefit) program should be imposed
on all workers in the nation, with the costs of the cov-
Table 2
Surviving Child's Annual Benefit Payments in 2006 at Various
Salaries and Death Ages for Deceased Worker-Parent, in current
dollars (assuming child is otherwise eligible for benefits and using
SSA default assumptions as to deceased's prior earnings history)*
Salary on death date 20.000 40.000 60000 80,000 100.000 200,000
Worker dies at age 30 7.848 12,144 15,864 17,880 19,740 20,172
Worker dies at age 40 7.464 11.76 15.300 17.160 18.960 19,824
Wo rker dies at age 50 7 16 0692 16,524 19.608
Worker dies at age 60 1 10,092 65 15.948 17.412 8,960
*These figures are derived from calculators available on the Social Security Administration Web
site, www.ssa.gov.
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erage to be borne entirely by all workers. Accounts are
not individually owned; thus, wealth redistribution
among workers is a feature of the program. Higher-
income workers subsidize lower-income workers, and
workers without dependents subsidize workers with
dependents. Viewed as a whole, the Social Security
survivors' benefit is not an insignificant mandate, but
it is less aggressive than the public response to health
insurance, where hundreds of billions of dollars of
general revenues are spent annually on health care
access.
There are other limitations on the survivors' ben-
efit under Social Security that counter the suggestion
that the program reflects a strong public commitment
to making life insurance widely available and acces-
sible. No benefits are paid for spouses who are under
age 60 (unless the spouse is disabled, in which case
the benefits can begin at age 50), unless the spouse
is caring for a dependent child under age 16. If the
surviving spouse elects to take the benefits for her full
retirement age, the monthly payments are reduced. If
the surviving spouse is eligible for retirement benefits
because of her own earnings history, the survivor's
benefit is reduced. If the surviving spouse remarries
before age 60, the benefits are unavailable; and if the
surviving spouse works, the benefits may be reduced.
These kinds of limitations on a beneficiary's recov-
ery are utterly foreign to life insurance purchased
in the private market, which severely undercuts the
suggestion that the survivors' benefit reflects a strong
public commitment to widespread availability of life
insurance.
Social Security is not the only source of life insurance
benefits in the public market. If the death is workplace
related, some limited benefits will be provided under
the auspices of the state Workers' Compensation sys-
tem, which essentially mandates a range of insurance
protections for workers. If the death occurs in an auto-
mobile accident, in 10 to 12 states the mandatory first-
party coverage of an automobile insurance policy will
provide some minimum benefits to the deceased's fam-
ily. Like the survivors' benefit in Social Security, these
are essentially government-mandated life insurance
protections that are privately financed. The benefits
are limited,37 and thus cannot be offered as evidence of
a strong public commitment to widespread access to
and availability of life insurance.
In short, unlike health insurance, for which strong
public sentiment, and arguably a consensus, exists
that health insurance should be universally available
or nearly so, there is no similar sentiment with respect
to life insurance. Notwithstanding the presence of
life insurance coverage in the Social Security system
and a few other areas, life insurance is, and is likely
to remain for the foreseeable future, a discretionary
purchase viewed as desirable, but not so necessary
that its purchase should be compulsory or its avail-
ability underwritten through the expenditure of public
resources.
C. Disability Insurance
When compared to health and life insurance, the pen-
etration of disability insurance in the private market is
even less significant. In 2006, only 39 percent of the
work force had private short-term disability insurance,
and only 30 percent had private long-term disability
insurance.38 The gap between employers offering health
insurance and offering disability insurance is dramatic;
studies in the late 1990s found that 76 percent offer
health insurance as a fringe benefit, but only 43 percent
offer long-term disability insurance.39 Among small
firms, 64 percent provide health insurance, but only 22
percent provide long-term disability insurance.40
Why is the private disability insurance market so
limited? The lower-income disability market essen-
tially disappeared when disability protection was
extended to Social Security participants in the late
1950s.41 Disability insurance has become a highly
specialized market where only a few insurers sell the
product, and fewer still do so on an individual basis;
profitability is elusive.42 Also, the concept of "disabil-
ity" is more abstract than damage to property or a
loss of life. More room for debate exists with regard
to whether a claimant is actually disabled on a given
set of facts, which increases claims processing costs
and drives up the cost of coverage. To the extent this
encourages some insureds to claim benefits in doubtful
situations, the average cost of the coverage increases,
reducing demand. In addition, potential policyholders
seem to underestimate the risk of becoming disabled,
which tends to suppress demand for the product. All
of these factors combined constrain consumers' pur-
chase of the coverage. This has led some commenta-
tors to observe that Americans are less insured for dis-
ability than for any other risk. As one observer put it,
"[m]ost American workers (particularly professionals)
are better prepared to die than they are to become dis-
abled for an extended period of time. This is disturbing
because there is a greater likelihood that an individual
will become disabled for a substantial period of time
(more than 90 days) during his working years (particu-
larly the younger years) than there is that he will die
during those years."4 3
There are also barriers to expansion of the exist-
ing market for disability insurance. First, the threat
of adverse selection constrains insurers' interest in
expanding their disability insurance offerings. Most
applicants are seeking the coverage for the first time,
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and a disproportionate number consider themselves to
have some risk factor that increases their need for the
coverage. This raises insurers' average costs and, inevi-
tably, the premiums charged for policyholders. Higher
prices, of course, reduce demand, except among those
who consider themselves to have a special need for the
coverage. Those who are not deterred from acquiring
the coverage will purchase less because of the higher
prices. 44 Adverse selection concerns are less acute
with group insurance, but the problem does not van-
ish, particularly with respect to smaller groups, which
have less capacity to spread risks.
Moral hazard also limits the supply of disability cov-
erage. As Abraham and Liebman observe, moral hazard
is present both ex ante (a disability insured is more likely
to become disabled than an uninsured person) and ex
poste (the disability insured will recover from a disabil-
ity more slowly and is more likely to never recover). 45
Insurers try to respond to moral hazard through incen-
tives to remain healthy and recover quickly (such as
writing the coverage for no more than 60 percent of
after-tax income and reducing benefits by the amounts
recovered from Social Security disability and Workers'
Compensation programs), but the response cannot be
perfect, which leaves a significant measure of moral
hazard as a barrier to expansion of the market.46
There is a public version of disability insurance
provided through the Social Security system that is
designed to provide benefits for workers who become
disabled before they reach retirement age. The benefit
is important, but it is not robust. Total disability insur-
ance benefits paid under the program in 2004 were
$5.94 billion.4 7 Before receiving benefits, a worker
must satisfy the eligibility limitations. Although not
particularly difficult to meet, the typical worker must
be employed for ten years before becoming eligible for
the benefits. A worker earns up to four credits per year
and needs 40 for eligibility; also, 20 of the credits must
have been earned in the 10 years prior to the disabili-
ty's onset, although younger workers may qualify with
fewer credits .4 8 The disability must be one that is severe
enough to prevent the worker from being employed for
at least a year, and the definition of disability is strict:
If the worker can adjust to other work while having the
medical condition, then the worker is not considered
disabled. The benefits paid depend on one's prior earn-
ing history and the age at which the worker became
disabled, as Table 3 illustrates.
Qualified children may also receive a monthly
payment of up to one-half of the worker's disability
amount, and there are also benefits for spouses and
divorced spouses. Family maximums also exist, and
these are in the range of 150 to 180 percent of the
worker's benefit. As Table 3 shows, disability benefits
under the Social Security program are thin. Without
other savings, insurance, or investments, a worker and
his or her family would have severe difficulty subsisting
on these payments. In addition, as the discussion with
respect to survivors' benefits above indicates, there is
no public contribution to this program out of general
revenues; the program is fully funded by employee and
matching employer contributions.
One program that, among other things, provides
disability coverage is the Social Security Income Pro-
gram (SSI), which is administered by the Social Secu-
rity Administration but is funded with general tax rev-
enues. This program provides assistance for elderly,
blind, and disabled persons, providing cash to meet
basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter.49 But SSI
is very limited due to strict eligibility requirements,
and even if one is eligible, the payments are minimal;
the basic SSI payment in 2006 was $603 per month
for one person and $904 per month per couple. Some
states add funds to enhance this basic rate, but the
amount can be reduced if someone else helps pay for
food and shelter. Workers' compensation is also a
Table 3
Disabled Worker's Annual Benefit Payments in 2006 at Various
Salaries and Ages at which Disability Began, in dollars*
Salary on date of disability 20.000 40.000 60,000 80.000 100.000 200.000
Worker disabled at age 30 10.236 15,768 20.844 23.436 25.908 26.304
Worker disabled at age 40 9,816 14,928 20.016 22,584 24,912 26,256
Worker disabled at age 50 9,456 14,184 18,912 21,960 24,132 26.076
Worker disabled at age 60 9.048 13,368 17.688 21,192 23.196 25.080
*These figures are derived from calculators available on the Social Security Administration Web site,
www.ssa.gov.
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source of disability compensation, and some coverage
is available in some states with auto no-fault laws, but
these sources of coverage are limited.50
To summarize, disability insurance in the United
States is very differently situated than health insur-
ance. Like life insurance, disability insurance is cur-
rently regarded as a discretionary expenditure, and
this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
Unlike health insurance where there is strong pub-
lic sentiment that the coverage should be universally
available or nearly so, no similar imperative exists with
respect to disability insurance. Disability insurance
will continue to be viewed as desirable but, like life
insurance, not so necessary that its purchase should
be compulsory or its availability underwritten through
the expenditure of public resources.
III. Implications
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing dis-
cussion is relatively straightforward. To the extent a
consensus is reached in the political process that an
insurance product or particular coverage should be
universally provided (or at least universally available)
or extended to particular segments of the population
at public expense, barriers to the availability of that
product - such as insurers' use of genetic information
in underwriting - are less likely to be tolerated, as such
restrictions undercut the public's effort to increase
access to the product. But where there is little commit-
ment to using public resources to support extension
of a particular coverage, underwriting and rate-set-
ting practices that limit the availability of coverage are
more likely to be tolerated.
When this calculus is applied to disability insurance,
the challenges facing those who would urge limita-
tions on disability insurers' use of genetic information
in underwriting and rate calculations are daunting. By
any measure, communitarian values are stronger in
health insurance than in either life or disability insur-
ance. The discussion in the prior section makes this
point, as the public commitment to extending health
insurance coverage is vastly greater than that which
exists with respect to either life or disability insurance.
In addition, most health insurance is sold on a group
basis, where the underwriting factors used by insurers
are less refined; the percentage of disability and life
insurance sold in group markets is much less. Thus,
community rating is more prevalent in health insur-
ance, and the effects of adverse selection are weaker
than with either disability or life insurance. Health
insurance is sold on an annual basis, which means
renewal is not possible, giving insurers less reason to
fear the impact of adverse selection or moral hazard.
In contrast, life insurance is typically automatically
renewable, which makes adverse selection and moral
hazard more worrisome. Noncancellable disability
insurance is less available than in the past, but this
reflects increasing tightness in the disability line and
does not show evidence of private insurers' embracing
community rating principles.
With respect to health insurance, it is fair to describe
the American experience as one of slow, incremental
movement toward greater availability of coverage and
universal access. (The difficulties facing the economy
and federal and state budgets in recent years are likely
to produce a hiatus in this movement, but it is unlikely
that the trend of recent decades will be reversed.) If
insurers are allowed to make distinctions in under-
writing and risk classification based on genetic infor-
mation, access to coverage will be limited to those who
do not fare as well on whatever standards insurers use
for evaluating the relevance of genetic information.
In health insurance, this would create, rather than
ameliorate, barriers to health care. It is not surprising,
then, that 46 states have some kind of regulation of the
use of genetic information in health insurance, includ-
ing limitations on insurer requirements for testing,
insurer requests for information about past tests, or
insurer use of testing information in making eligibility
or renewal decisions, setting rates, or underwriting.
But, consistent with the calculus described above, only
a small number of these statutes have any relevance to
life insurance, and still fewer have any connection to
disability insurance.
At the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)5 regulates
insurers' use of genetic information in group health
insurance plans (defined as plans in which two or
more employees are enrolled).52 HIPAA, in limiting
the effectiveness of pre-existing condition exclusions
in health insurance, provides that genetic information
cannot, in and of itself, constitute a pre-existing con-
dition, which means that a covered employee cannot
face a denial of coverage based on genetic informa-
tion alone. In addition, the anti-discrimination provi-
sions of HIPAA prohibit group health plans and health
insurance issuers from using genetic information to
discriminate against individual participants and ben-
eficiaries. Thus, with respect to group health plans
covering two or more employees (note that individual
plans are not regulated), HIPAA limits how genetic
information can be used to adversely affect an individ-
ual. But HIPAA, by its express terms, does not apply to
disability insurance. 53
The arguments commonly made against insurers'
use of genetic information in underwriting and rate-
setting generally have the same moral force in any line
of insurance. For example, the arguments that such
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use irrationally discriminates, unfairly determines
price and availability of coverage based on circum-
stances beyond the insured's control, unfairly burdens
a small number of people, emphasizes factors that
tend to concentrate in racial or ethnic groups, imposes
a stigma on innocent persons, and promotes a practice
of subordinating persons (often termed "geneticism") 54
are as relevant to life and disability insurance as they
are to health insurance. But these arguments have not
resulted in significant statutory limitations on insur-
ers' use of genetic information in any line other than
health insurance. In fact, nothing similar to the reg-
ulation of genetic information that exists in health
insurance applies to either life or disability insurance.
As noted above, given the lack of commitment to uni-
versal coverage in life and disability insurance, this
result is not surprising.
Last but certainly not least, it is difficult to imagine
the question of access to life and disability insurance
receiving serious attention in the political process until
the formidable problem of gaps in health care access is
solved. In the absence of a commitment to universal
access and availability in life and disability insurance,
barriers to coverage are more likely to be tolerated. If
a consensus were reached in the political process that
every American should enjoy some minimum package
of disability insurance benefits as either a matter of
entitlement or right, the case for eliminating a wider
range of underwriting factors from insurers' arsenal -
including genetic information - would become much
stronger. It is unlikely, however, that these issues will
be confronted anytime soon.
If the foregoing analysis accurately describes the
current landscape, it suggests that efforts to impose
broad restrictions on disability insurers' use of genetic
information in underwriting and rate-setting are
unlikely to garner the public support needed to over-
come insurers' resistance to such restrictions. But nar-
rowly tailored regulation of insurers' use of genetic
information in disability insurance may be feasible.
For example, in portions of the disability insurance
market where little underwriting occurs and where
adverse selection and moral hazard pressures have lit-
tle force, such as in the large group market, proposals
to eliminate the use of genetic information in under-
writing are less likely to be controversial. This may
also be true in some portions of the small group mar-
ket. In other words, in portions of the market where
community rating principles have some grip, insurers
may not actively resist being asked to surrender the
use of genetic information in underwriting. Thus, one
avenue for reform might involve extending the regula-
tory framework of HIPAA to disability insurance. This
framework would use the distinction between group
and individual insurance as the basis for drawing the
line between segments of the disability insurance mar-
ket where insurers can use genetic information and
segments where they cannot.
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